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Abstract – Previous research has shown that in many low and middle income countries micro and 
small entrepreneurs achieve relative high marginal returns to capital but show only very low re-
investment rates. Existing research is rather inconclusive about the possible causes. We explore 
whether forced solidarity, i.e. abusive demands by the family and kin hinder entrepreneurs to save 
and to invest. We start from a relatively simple theoretical model in which households consume 
and pursue different income generating activities, mainly the production of goods and services and 
the engagement in dependent wage work outside the household. Value added of the household 
business is subject to a solidarity tax imposed by the household’s wider family and kin-group. In 
this model a higher solidarity tax leads to a reallocation of productive resources away from 
household production to other income generating activities and leisure. We use an original data set 
of West-African migrant entrepreneurs to see whether the empirical observation is consistent with 
the predictions of the model. We find some evidence that family and kinship structures within the 
city enhance labour effort and the use of capital. However, closeness to the area of origin seem to 
have adverse effects on both. 
 
JEL-Codes: D13, D61, O12. 
Key-words: Kinship, Forced solidarity, social networks, informal sector, firm growth, West-
Africa. 
                                                 
 This research is part of a project entitled “Unlocking potential: Tackling economic, institutional and social 
constraints of informal entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa” (http://www.iss.nl/informality) funded by the 
Austrian, German, Norwegian, and Korean Government through the World Bank’s Multi Donor Trust Fund 
Project: “Labor Markets, Job Creation, and Economic Growth, Scaling up Research, Capacity Building, and 
Action on the Ground”. The financial support is gratefully acknowledged. 
 Corresponding author: Michael Grimm, International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX The Hague, The Netherlands, Phone: +31-70-4260694, Fax: +31-70-
4260799, E-mail: grimm@iss.nl. 
 
 2
Ici en Afrique, quand tu n’as pas ta famille à côté, il faut savoir que tu vas souffrir. 
(Rasmané, 45 ans, tailleur, Ouagadougou, 2009)1 
 
En Afrique, tu ne dis même pas à ta femme, quand tu as de l’argent. 
(Thérèse, 42 ans, comptable, Ouagadougou, 2010)2 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The economic stagnation in the informal sector which can be observed in many poor countries 
is often explained by the existence of ‘poverty traps’, i.e. the co-existence of non-convex 
production technologies in conjunction with capital market constraints (see e.g. Banerjee and 
Newman, 1993). Returns in the informal sector would be very low at low levels of capital, but 
much higher once a certain threshold of capital is exceeded. From there returns may fall 
again, but slowly. Hence, if entrepreneurs are constrained on the capital market and cannot 
overcome this threshold they are caught in a ‘poverty-trap’, i.e. face persistently low returns 
or simply exit the market. 
 
A few studies have rigorously analyzed this hypothesis; however none of them has found 
strong support for it. The evidence is rather in favor of very high rates of return to capital at 
low levels of invested capital. Very convincing evidence comes from a recent randomized 
controlled trial with Sri Lankan micro and small enterprises by de Mel et al. (2008). De Mel 
et al. (2008) allocated randomly in-kind and cash transfers to micro and small enterprises. 
They found returns to capital of about 80 percent per year. In a similar experiment in Mexico 
they find even higher returns (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008). Using a policy change in a 
directed lending program as a natural experiment, Banerjee and Duflo (2004) estimate a very 
similar rate of return for small- and medium-scale industrial firms in India. McKenzie and 
Woodruff (2006) examine entry costs and capital returns using detailed cross-sectional 
microenterprise data for Mexico. With this data, they also find only little evidence for the 
existence of high entry costs. To the contrary, start-up costs tend to be fairly low for some 
industries and returns to capital very high at lower levels of invested capital. For Ghana, Udry 
and Anagol (2006) find extremely high returns to investment into pineapple cultivation that 
often exceed 100 percent. In contrast to McKenzie and Woodruff (2006), they detect 
considerable entry barriers to investing into this new technology.3 However, even marginal 
investment into more traditional crops using existing technology yields very high returns of 
around 30 percent. Udry and Anagol (2006) then also estimate (a lower bound for) marginal 
returns to capital in informal non-agricultural activities, as revealed by the relative prices of 
capital goods with varying durability (used car parts). Their estimate suggests a rate of return 
to capital of approximately 60 percent, which again is relatively high. Lastly, Kremer, Lee 
and Robinson (2010) analyze returns to inventories in a longitudinal sample of retail firms in 
rural Kenya. The authors find an average (median) marginal annualized rate of return of 113 
(36) percent. Returns differ largely across shops suggesting again large potential gains from 
improving the allocation of capital. Kremer et al. (2010) do not explicitly analyze the causes 
                                                 
1 Quote taken from Pasquier-Doumer (2010). 
2 Own interview, conducted in Ouagadougou in March 2010. 
3 The literature on income diversification of rural households also suggests the existence of considerable entry 
barriers into non-farm activities that yield considerably higher returns than agriculture (Reardon and Taylor, 
1996; Haggblade et al., 2005; Lay et al., 2008) 
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of that heterogeneity but evoke credit market imperfections and behavioral factors that limit 
the ability of entrepreneurs to make optimal allocation decisions as potential reasons. 
 
Even if credit constraints are binding for many entrepreneurs in these settings, there is no 
systematic evidence for poverty traps. In contrast, what is surprising and puzzling is that in 
more or less all these studies it has been shown that re-investment rates are fairly low. Hence 
an obvious question is why is this case despite the high returns? Even if capital markets do not 
function smoothly, if entry barriers are largely absent, a ‘rational’ entrepreneur would simply 
accumulate profits and re-invest. A straightforward answer could be that entrepreneurs are 
risk averse or simply have time-inconsistent preferences. It might also be that they are 
recurrently hit by shocks that require liquidity to cope. Another possibility could be the lack 
of savings institutions or at least the lack of knowledge about how these institutions function. 
Finally, it might be that entrepreneurs have problems to save because of high consumption 
demands by their family and kin or at least that incentives to invest are low, because the 
entrepreneur anticipates that a large part of the benefits will have to be shared with others. 
This is in the sociological literature often denoted as ‘forced solidarity’ or the ‘dark side of 
social capital’ (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993).  
 
In this paper, we explore this latter aspect. Do the family and kin have negative incentive 
effects on potentially successful entrepreneurs? We analyze this question first theoretically 
and then test the implied hypotheses using a large sample of informal entrepreneurs covering 
seven economic capitals in West-Africa. Grimm et al. (2010) found similar evidence as the 
studies cited above; very high marginal returns for low levels of capital, absence of substantial 
entry barriers and low re-investment rates, which, again, raises the question what prevents 
entrepreneurs from investing? Focusing on internal migrants, i.e. entrepreneurs that migrated 
from rural areas or secondary cities to the economic capital and started an informal business, 
we find evidence that is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical model. The more 
intense the ties to the family and the kin in the area of origin the less resources an 
entrepreneur allocates to the production activity. However, we also find that family and kin-
ship ties within the economic capital are associated with a more efficient factor allocation. 
Hence, in contrast to family networks tied to the village, local networks seem to have positive 
incentive effects. A possible interpretation is that local networks in the city are characterized 
by modern values and mutual support, whereas ties to the village are characterized by 
traditional sharing rules and norms. Although our data set is unique in many respects it is not 
experimental and does not have a panel dimension, hence the results have to be interpreted 
with the necessary caution. Further research is needed to work out the underlying causalities.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
and lays out the key-concepts. Section 3 develops a simple theoretical household model 
illustrating how sharing obligations may adversely affect the allocation of resources to the 
household business. Section 4 presents the context of this study and the used data sources. 
Section 5 analyzes empirically how redistributive pressure affects the allocation of physical 
capital and labour to the firm. Section 8 concludes. 
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2. A brief review of the related literature 
At the outset it is important to distinguish between ‘family and kinship ties’ on the one hand 
and ‘social network capital’ on the other. In line with La Ferrara (2007), we use family and 
kin-ship ties to refer to any form of blood relationship. At one end we situate family ties as the 
most proximate type of relationship. At the other end we situate kin-ship ties as a rather 
distant type that is characterized by socially recognized relationships based on supposed as 
well as actual genealogical ties. The main difference of family and kinship ties on the one 
hand and a generic set of individuals who interact on the other hand is that family and kin-
ship ties can be seen as largely exogenous and cannot be freely changed or only at a high 
psychological cost (La Ferrara, 2007). However, in the literature that distinction is often not 
made and family and kinship ties are mixed with any type of social network capital. There is 
large consensus in the literature that social network capital provides a wide range of benefits 
by reducing transaction costs, facilitating the access to information, helping to overcome the 
dilemmas of collective action, generateing learning spin-offs and providing informal 
insurance (see e.g. Coleman 1990; Fafchamps, 1996, 2001, 2002; Kranton, 1996; Woolcock, 
1998, 2001; Minten and Fafchamps, 1999; Platteau, 2000; Knorringa and van Staveren, 
2006).  
 
Our distinction between family and kinship ties on the one hand and social network capital on 
the other largely overlaps with the distinction made in the field of economic sociology and 
social network analysis between ‘weak ties’ and ‘strong ties’ (Granovetter, 1973, 1983). 
Strong ties describe those links to the immediate family and kin and refer to rather closed 
networks. Weak ties, in contrast, go beyond the own social circles. Weak ties play for instance 
a central role in the circulation of and access to information, such as information on factor and 
product markets. However, strong ties may be important for risk sharing or social insurance 
and to access the capital required to start a business. 
 
The idea that family and kin-ship ties may also imply adverse incentive effects is relatively 
old. It is quite often mentioned in the anthropological literature (see e.g. Barth, 1967) and was 
later emphasized by modernization theorists but with very different nuances and clearly 
distinguished conclusions (see e.g, Lewis, 1955; Meier and Baldwin, 1957; Bauer and Yamey, 
1957; Hirschman, 1958; Rostow, 1960). It is also discussed in the field of economic sociology 
and social network analysis as the downside of strong ties, which are also often referred to as 
‘bonding ties’ (Granovetter, 1973, 1983, 1985; Barr, 2002). More recently the aspect has been 
taken up again by a few economists (see e.g. Platteau, 2000; Hoff and Sen, 2006; Luke and 
Munshi, 2006). Although these authors admit that family and kin-ship ties can be a vehicle for 
social contracts of mutual insurance in a context where market for these goods and services do 
not exist, they argue that family and kinship ties may become an important obstacle in the 
process of transition. Members of the kin system that achieve economic success in the modern 
sector may be confronted with sharing obligations by less successful fellows. This may imply 
to remit money, to find urban jobs or to host them in the city home (see e.g. Hoff and Sen, 
2006). The hypothesis is then, that the need to meet such demands can adversely affect the 
incentives of kin members to pursue and develop their economic activity in the modern sector. 
Gargiulo and Benassi (1997) argue that strong family and kinship ties may also limit the 
entrepreneur’s ability to keep control on the composition of his business network and 
jeopardize his adaptability to changing task environments. Opting out of such kin systems and 
refusing to comply with these obligations may be possible but may result in strong sanctions 
and high psychological costs and the kin group may want to prevent this ex ante by 
manipulate (as in Hoff and Sen’s (2006) model) the relevant exit-barriers. 
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Platteau, for instance, writes – very drastically – that in tribal societies, in particular, in those 
which are characterized by strong traditions “the economic success of an individual [may] 
breed[s] parasitic behaviour, which […] does not stop until the rich individual is ruined and 
brought back to the fold” (Platteau, 2000, p. 208). He continues by emphasizing that “the 
negative effects of traditional norms of generosity and redistribution in terms of incentives to 
savings and innovations are not confined to the countryside but may also affect modern cities 
where many proprietors are unable to resist kinship demands to any great extent, especially so 
in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Platteau, 2000, p. 209).  If forced redistribution of this type is 
widespread it may partly explain the failure of many African micro and small enterprises to 
grow. As pointed out by Platteau (2000), it might also explain why minority entrepreneurs 
like the Indians in East Africa and the Lebanese and Syrians in West Africa are often so 
successful and contribute so crucially to the development of the private sector of that region. 
In fact, so the argument, these minorities are not directly exposed to requests of relatives and 
stand outside the complex web of social obligations. 
 
To date, there is very little empirical backup for the existence of negative effects of social 
networks on entrepreneurial activities. Some related evidence however indicates that the 
composition and structure of the households matter for capital accumulation, e.g. that larger 
polygamous households find it more difficult to save and accumulate (Morrisson, 2006). 
Duflo et al. (2009) put forward a similar argument, when showing that impatient Kenyan 
farmers forgo highly profitable investments in fertilizer. The authors argue that the impatience 
is partly rooted in the difficulty of protecting savings from consumption demands. Di Falco 
and Bulte (2009) find some evidence that kinship size is associated with higher budget shares 
for non-sharable goods. They also find evidence that compulsory sharing leads to free riding 
and attenuates incentives for self-protection against shocks (Di Falco and Bulte, 2010). Lastly, 
Baland, Guirkinger and Mali (2007) analyze borrowing behaviour and find that some people 
take up credits even without liquidity constraint – just to signal to their kin that they are 
unable to provide financial assistance. 
 
In the empirical part of our paper, we focus on internal migrants, i.e. people that moved from 
the country side (or secondary cities) to the economic capital and started there some form of 
informal business. We then explore to what extent ties with the family and kin within the city 
and with those that stayed behind in the villages affect the allocation of resources in the 
production activity. The ‘new economics of migration’ (e.g. Lucas and Stark, 1985; Stark, 
1999) views migration as a part of a general livelihood strategy of families, i.e. family 
members maximize a joint utility function and decide together to send one or several 
members to the city either to make use of income earning opportunities and thus to increase 
household income or as a way to diversify income sources and thus to share risk. Although 
our empirical framework does not allow looking at the dynamic aspects of migration 
decisions, our model is such that we do not consider transfers to other family and kin 
members as per se detrimental to entrepreneurship. We analyze the allocation of resources, 
such as labour and capital, of entrepreneurs to their production activity. If transfers are made 
within self-enforcing intertemporal contractual arrangements, we should not observe adverse 
incentive effects. Migrants would just optimally allocate their available resources and then 
redistribute out of maximized profits. If however, we find that the intensity of family and kin-
ship ties is associated with a sub-optimal allocation of resources, we take this as evidence that 
the family may indeed holding back its members from benefiting from market development. 
 
Moreover, recent research suggests that the degree of sharing between migrants and the 
villagers that stayed behind may be less important than often thought. Beegle et al. (2008) for 
instance use a tracking survey covering households and migrants originated from Tanzania’s 
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Kagera region. Although they find significant higher consumption growth among migrants 
compared to those who stayed in the village, they do not find any evidence that migrants and 
non-migrants smooth their consumption. Households in the village that have one of their 
former members elsewhere have not more ease to cope with shocks. This even holds for 
parent-child networks. Moreover, they find that migrants transfer even less than non-migrant 
split-off households (i.e. children that move out of the parental home but stay close by). 
Hence, they conclude that migration, at least in this context, does not emerge as a livelihood 
strategy to cope with risk in the extended family (Beegle et al., 2008). 
 
 
3. Theoretical framework  
3.1 Basic Set up 
The following model incorporates the idea that family and kin-ship ties may lead to adverse 
incentive effects, i.e. we focus only on the potential negative effects and ignore for the 
moment possible positive effects. The model is a simple static model of an urban household 
who engages in a non-agricultural production activity.4 This model, which draws on a more 
general version described in detail in Grimm, Lay, Thiele and Wiebelt (2010), takes into 
account the interdependence of household production and consumption. Hence, inspired by 
the literature on agricultural households (see e.g. Singh, Squire and Strauss, 1986; Sadoulet 
and De Janvry, 1995), we assume that urban households can be represented by a model that 
combines the household and the firm. 
 
For any production cycle, the household is assumed to maximize an increasing and quasi-
concave utility function: 
 
 Max U = U(X, l), (1) 
 
where X denotes consumption of market goods and l stands for leisure, a non-market good. 
Utility is maximized subject to the following cash income constraint: 
 
 p (X - Q )+ R + wLh + rKh  + pv V ≤  p F(L, K, V ) + w Lm + S (2) 
 
 with Kh ≥ 0 
 
where p is the price and (X - Q ) the quantity of the market-purchased good. If (X - Q) is 
positive the household is a net buyer of the good. R stands for transfers paid to other 
households. R is assumed to be endogenous and is specified below. The household has to pay 
for hired labour Lh at the wage rate w, for rented capital goods Kh at the rental rate r and for 
intermediate inputs V (such as raw materials, energy or water) at the unit price pv. On the right 
hand side of (2), we have income that is generated through production F and sold at the 
market price pi, labour offered on the market at the wage rate w and an exogenous cash 
endowment S. The cash endowment can result from past savings, transfers received ahead of 
production from other households or from loans (from formal or informal money lenders). We 
assume that it is not possible to rent out capital goods.  
 
We assume that expenditures on rented capital and intermediate inputs have to be incurred 
before production and this requires financial liquidity (or working capital): 
 
                                                 
4 In reality, the household may be engaged in a variety of such activities, run by different individual household 
members. In our theoretical model, we nonetheless assume that the household only operates a single activity. We 
return to this issue in our empirical analyses below. 
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S ≥ rKh + pv V. (3) 
 
The cash endowment of the household may suffice to cover these costs or not. Hence, this 
credit constraint may or may not be binding. 
 
The household also faces a time-constraint, i.e. it cannot allocate more time to work outside 
the household, production and leisure than is available in the household: 
 
 El = Lo + Lm + l, (4) 
 
where Lo stands for informal labour supplied to the own business and El is the total stock of 
household time. 
 
Moreover, the following resource constraints must be satisfied: 
 
 L = Lf + Lh   and (5) 
 
 K= Kf + Kh. (6) 
 
At this stage it is assumed that own informal labour Lf and hired informal labour Lh are perfect 
substitutes. The same applies to own, Kf, and hired capital, Kh. 
 
We further assume that the household operates with the following increasing and concave 
production technology: 
 
 Q = F(L, K, V, Zh), (7) 
 
where Zh are exogenous household characteristics including those of the owner, such as 
education and experience. Zh is assumed to affect the total factor productivity. We make 
standard assumptions on the marginal products of capital and labour, i.e. 
 
 ,0 LF  ,0)( 2
2  LF  ,0 KF  and 0)( 2
2  KF . 
 
In this basic set-up we ignore any risk related to production. 
 
Transfers R to be paid to other households are assumed to be a share of the firm’s value 
added, VA (turnover minus the costs for intermediate inputs), i.e. transfers are treated like a 
tax: 
 
R = s VA,    with    0 ≤ s ≤ 1  (8) 
 
with 
 
VA = p F(L,K,V,Zh) - pvV. (9) 
 
We assume that failing to pay R, implies prohibitive social sanctions. In the most general 
case, the share s that has to be paid (the “tax rate” or “solidarity tax”) depends on egalitarian 
norms prevailing in the entrepreneur’s kin, N, on the size of the kin, T, and on the costs to 
observe the entrepreneur’s profits, C, thus 
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s = f (N, T, C) (10) 
 
with  
 
0 Ns , 0 Ts , and 0 Cs .5 
 
Our idea is that the kin can easier observe the firm’s value added than labour income from the 
market. This should in particular be true if firms exceed a certain size and thus operate from 
of a fixed location, exceed a certain level of capital stock and employ non-family labour. 
Earnings from jobs outside the household are hence assumed to be more difficult to observe 
for the kin. A civil servant in Ouagadougou told us, for instance, that he prefers to have a 
motorbike instead of a car, as a car would immediately give a signal to the family that he 
earns a good salary. Although, the assumption of non-observability might be strong in case of 
a high-ranking employee in the public sector (even if he foregoes a car to use a normal 
motorbike), but in the economies we study here less than seven percent are employed in the 
public sector and of those less than 30 percent are classified as ‘cadre supérieur’. By far, the 
largest share of employment is in informal firms, often without any written labour contract, 
any payment statements and any agreement regarding the term of the employment (77.4 
percent) (Brilleau, Roubaud, Torelli, 2005).6  
 
Again, our theoretical model focuses on the potential negative effects of family and kinship 
ties. However, positive effects could easily be included by reducing the prices of production 
factors or by increasing the total factor productivity in the production function. 
 
We assume that all prices in the model (p, pv, w, r) are exogenously given and not affected by 
the actions of the household. Thus, the household behaves like a price taker in the four 
markets.  
 
 
3.2 Solution under perfect markets 
Although the model described above implies one market imperfection – physical capital 
cannot be rented out – a household can still behave like a profit maximizer. If the credit 
constraint is not binding, the model is recursive and separability holds. The household hence 
uses capital and labour such that marginal returns are equal to marginal costs. Note that the 
marginal returns to capital and labour are net of the remittances that have to be paid to other 
households. Additional labour and capital is hired at the respective market rates. If family 
labour endowments exceed the optimal level of labour necessary for production, informal 
labour is rented out (or additional labour is hired in if more labour is optimal). 
 
Hence, under complete markets, we get the following first-order conditions: 
 
p
w
L
Qs 
 )1(  (11) 
 
 
p
r
K
Qs 
 )1(  (12) 
                                                 
5 The model could be extended to allow s also to depend on the level of value added itself (e.g. increasing in 
value added, i.e. a progressive tax). 
6  For a detailed analysis of employment vulnerability in the seven West African countries we study, see 
Bocquier, Nordman and Vescovo (2010). 
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p
p
V
Q v
n

  (13) 
 
 
p
w
X
U
l
U 


  (14) 
 
It is straightforward to see that the choice variables X and l do not affect the demand for the 
production factors L and K (provided second order conditions are also met). The 
maximisation problem is recursive and the maximised value of profits can be substituted in 
Equation (2), which yields: 
 
 Y* = Π + S  + w (Lm + Xl), (15) 
 
where Y* is the value of full income associated with profit-maximising behaviour and Π are 
profits from the informal business, i.e. value added minus all costs for labour, capital, inputs 
and made transfers, R. Conditional on full income, households maximize utility, hence the 
problem is separable. From Equation (14) one can derive the demand equations for X and l as 
functions of prices (p, w) and full income (Y*).  
 
In Grimm et al. (2010) we discuss solutions under various assumptions on market 
imperfections. In this paper, we skip this discussion and focus only on the role of family and 
kinship ties represented by the solidarity tax. 
 
 
3.3 The role of transfers and the solidarity tax 
From Equations (11) and (12) we see that the solidarity tax on value added drives a wedge 
between the marginal factor products and real factor prices. Ceteris paribus, households 
allocate less labour and capital to production the higher the tax rate s. In the case of labour, 
this implies that with higher s less labour is hired or more family labour is offered to 
dependent wage work outside the household. 
 
Value added will hence be lower at higher solidarity taxes and under the assumed neoclassical 
production technology with decreasing marginal returns this implies that marginal factor 
products will be higher. Subsequently, we will thus test the following hypotheses: For two 
otherwise similar households 1 and 2, facing different tax rates s1 and s2, where s1 > s2, we 
expect L1 < L2, K1 < K2 and VA1 < VA2. 
 
 
4. Context and Data 
4.1 Context 
In this study, we focus on households and entrepreneurs in seven agglomerations in West-
Africa: Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Bamako 
(Mali), Niamey (Niger), Dakar (Senegal) and Lomé (Togo). In West-Africa, as in other parts 
of Africa, the extended family and kinship networks are pronounced and important. For 
Burkina Faso, Pasquier-Doumer (2010) reports, based on a primary data collection, that social 
networks are widely used at various occasions in life, for instance to find employment or to 
fill a position, to find accommodation or to get financial assistance when necessary, in 
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particular for schooling expenditure, occasional ceremonies or to cope with health problems.7 
More specific evidence on the role of kinship ties with regard to entrepreneurial activities is 
provided by Chukwuezi (2001) for the Nigerian case. He shows that urban businessmen from 
the Igbo in Nigeria remain strongly linked to their rural kin. These ties included a 
commitment to make transfers to and invest in their rural home communities. Theses efforts – 
not their business success – were determining how they were regarded at home. Chukwuezi 
(2001) also claims that these links have been weakened recently. Younger generations would 
put less importance on kinship ties and financial demands based on cultural obligations would 
be seen as a burden rather than an arrangement for mutual benefit. There are numerous 
examples of how villagers ensure that traditional customs prevail, for example by punishing 
defecting community members through the denial of a burial in the rural home or exclusion 
from the community (Chukwuezi, 2001). The sharing obligations of migrants are also 
illustrated by the following quote from Hessling (2006) of a professor from Benin “It is not 
formal, but when there is something happening in the village, one of the elders will send me a 
message and I will help out. So I have to go help. I have to pay my participation. 
Obligatoirement, voilà, les formes de solidarité”. These highly selective pieces of anecdotal 
evidence illustrate that solidarity and sharing obligations within the family and kinship 
constitute an important aspect of social and economic life in Western Africa. While designed 
for the mutual benefit of community members, solidarity norms and rules seem to be 
(increasingly) percieved as a burden by some. Berrou (2010) indeed finds based on a dataset 
collected among informal entrepreneurs in Bobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso) that family and 
kinship ties represent only a quarter of all ties entrepreneurs rely on. 74.7 percent of all 
reported ties refer to business and sociability ties. However, he finds positive effects for both 
types of ties on value added and earnings. He also emphasizes the role of kinship ties for start-
up resources. Interestingly, he states that more educated entrepreneurs appear to rely on 
weaker ties. This may suggest their capacity to extract themselves from existing community 
constraints and to develop more flexible ties. 
 
 
4.2 Data 
For our empirical analysis we use a set of surveys called 1-2-3 surveys or in its French 
synonym ‘Enquêtes 1-2-3’. A 1-2-3 survey is a multi-layer survey organized in three phases 
and specially designed to study the informal sector (see Brilleau, Ouedraogo and Roubaud, 
2005). Phase 1 is a representative labor force survey collecting detailed information about 
individual socio-demographic characteristics and employment. Phase 2 is a survey which 
interviews a sub-sample of informal production units identified in Phase 1. The focus of this 
phase is on the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their production unit, including the 
characteristics of employed workers. It also contains detailed information on costs, input use, 
investment, sales and the unit’s forward and backward linkages. Phase 3 is a household 
expenditure survey interviewing (again) a representative sub-sample of Phase 1 and hence 
part of the Phase 2 households. The data of all three phases is organized such that it can be 
linked. Hence, for a (representative) sub-sample of informal entrepreneurs we have 
information from Phase 1 and Phase 2 (n=6,580) and, again for a subsample, information 
from all three phases (n=1,511). Phase 3 is not available for Abidjan, given the onset of 
violent actions in the country in 2001/02, the third part of the survey could not be undertaken 
there.  
 
Besides the detail of information, a major advantage of the 1-2-3 survey is that Phase 1 
ensures that Phase 2 delivers a representative picture of the informal sector, because being 
                                                 
7 These findings are based on interviews conducted in Ouagadougou with financial support by the Institut de 
recherche pour le développement (IRD). 
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sampled does for instance not depend on whether the entrepreneur has a fixed location or 
simply operates a business at home or in a fully mobile way. Thus this survey also includes 
entrepreneurs who are likely to be overseen in one-stage surveys where the sample population 
is produced from enterprise sampling frames. The 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as 
small production units that (a) do not have written formal accounts and/or (b) are not 
registered with the tax administration. Part (b) of this definition varies slightly between 
countries, as registration may not always refer to registration with tax authorities. The 1-2-3 
surveys do not apply a size criterion.8 
 
Focusing on informal enterprises means of course ignoring all formal enterprises and in 
particular ignoring firms that are larger in terms of their labor force and their capital stock and 
that probably show, on average, a better growth performance. However, as shown in previous 
work using the same data (see Grimm et al., 2010), heterogeneity among informal firms in 
terms of capital stock and performance (for example, capital returns) is likely to be sizeable 
enough to shed light on the effects of family and kinship ties.  
 
We focus on internal migrants, i.e. entrepreneurs that migrated from rural areas or secondary 
cities to the economic capital and started an informal business. Analyzing urban migrants has 
the advantage of looking at entrepreneurs that usually have two different types of family and 
kinship ties; one located at their destination and one located at their point of departure. The 
latter is often heavily marked by traditional norms and values. Comparing the role of both will 
provide interesting insights. In some steps of our analysis we will even limit the sample to 
recent migrants and exclude those that are already for a long time in the city. The latter may 
resemble more the non-migrants and may thus bias the results for migrants. The number of 
years a migrant is already located in the capital will also be one of the features characterizing 
firms that we will look at.  
 
In line with our theoretical model, and with standard practice in the literature on agricultural 
households, 9  we use the household as the observation unit. Hence, we aggregate all 
enterprises in a given household into one single enterprise. This aggregation is done as 
follows: We define the main firm in the household as the firm that generates the highest value 
added. Then we add within each household total labour, total capital and total value added. 
Regarding all other characteristics such as the sector of the firm and characteristics of the 
owner, we keep the values from the main firm. There may be various reasons why a 
household owns several enterprises. Diversifying entrepreneurial activities may represent an 
optimal portfolio choice in the presence of activities with different expected returns and 
associated risks. Enterprises may also belong to different household members that do not 
necessarily pool their resources. Finally, splitting activities may serve as a strategy to avoid 
‘taxes’ or demands from the extended family, because it is easier to hide several smaller 
enterprises than one large enterprise. Moreover, Camilleri (1996) provides anecdotic evidence 
that successful entrepreneurs employ their kin in peripheral firms to keep them away from the 
main and productive activity. The two latter aspects will make it particularly interesting to test 
whether the number of enterprises in the household - controlling for value added - has any 
effect on the amount of transfers given to other households. 
 
 
                                                 
8 For a detailed presentation of the data, see Brilleau, Ouedraogo and Roubaud (2005). 
9 The standard practice in the literature dealing with agricultural household models is to assume that plots within 
household can be aggregated irrespective whether they are cultivated or not by the household head. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the migrant entrepreneurs, their enterprises and the 
households they belong to. Again, several enterprises within the same household are 
aggregated to one single enterprise. On average, the households in the sample have 1.3 
enterprises.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We see that about half of all entrepreneurs in our sample are men, they are on average 38 
years old, about 43 percent of them speak French. 72 percent do not have any diploma, 18 
percent have completed primary school and only 10 percent have a diploma from a general or 
vocational secondary school or higher. We also coded a variable for ethnicity. In ethnic group 
‘1’ are those entrepreneurs who belong to the largest ethnic group in their country. Ethnic 
group ‘2’ are those who belong to the second largest group and so on. One can see that about 
80 percent of all entrepreneurs fall into one of the three largest groups in their country.  
 
The next block in Table 1 reports the activity portfolio of the entrepreneur’s household. These 
portfolios consider all primary and secondary activities of all household members. About 79.5 
percent of all entrepreneurs live in households that only run one or several informal firms. In 
some of these households, one or several household members are additionally engaged in 
some dependent informal wage work. Only 19.8 percent of all entrepreneurs live in 
households that have in addition to their enterprise at least one wage worker in the public 
sector (9.7 percent) or in the formal private sector (10 percent). The activity portfolio is a 
potential important factor of firm performance, as it may influence the capacity to save, to 
take a loan and to invest. It may also determine the business’ network size and shape the 
relation to the public sector and hence affect access to public services and exposure to 
corruption. 
 
The mean age of these enterprises is about 8.6 years. Table 1 also shows the distribution 
across sectors and countries. The largest sector is ‘petty trading’. The smallest sectors are 
‘transport’ and ‘repair services’, which are both rather capital intensive. In terms of countries, 
the sample is uniformly distributed given that the surveys all had similar sample sizes, except 
for Niger, which is a little bit smaller. The average annual value added is about 5,600 Intl. 
2005 $ PPP. Entrepreneurs work on average 225 hours per month in their enterprise. In total, 
they use about 381 hours of labour per month. Mean employment is about 1.9 including the 
owner and, on average, only one out of four enterprises hires a paid employee. 14 percent of 
all enterprises do not report any invested physical capital. Hence, it is not surprising to see 
that the mean capital stock for the lower third in the distribution of capital is just about 10 Intl. 
2005 $ PPP. The capital stock of the middle third is about 125 Intl. 2005 $ PPP and the capital 
stock of the top third is about 3,000 Intl. 2005 $ PPP.  
 
 
4.4 Measures of the potential intensity of family and kinship ties 
From our data set, we have derived the following proxies of the potential intensity of family 
and kinship ties, which in turn should determine the size of the solidarity tax, s. First, the 
share of the population from the same ethnic group in the cluster in which a household 
resides. This share is computed from Phase 1 using population weights such that it exactly 
reflects the true share in the total population. Clusters correspond to neighbourhoods in each 
of the agglomerations represented in our sample. There are about 125 per country (city) and 
they cover a population from about 300 up to 35,000. This measure of ethnic concentration is 
an obvious measure of the potential intensity of family and kinship ties. The higher the 
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concentration of the own kin-group in the neighbourhood, the higher the pressure to share 
earnings might be. However, a higher concentration of the own-kin group may also mean 
more support for own entrepreneurial activities. Hence, it is an empirical question whether 
these positive effects dominate or whether the above model that claims a negative effect is 
more in line with observations. Most likely both effects will be at work, probably off-setting 
each other to some extent. This would imply in turn that we will assess the ‘net effect’ of 
family and kinship networks in our empirical analysis. We also have to be aware of the fact 
that this first social network proxy cannot be considered as fully exogenous given that 
location is a choice. Our second proxy for the potential intensity of family and kinship ties is 
the share of the population in a cluster that grew up in the same area as the enterprise owner – 
i.e. in the same region or district of the country. Again we assume that the higher the share the 
higher the potential pressure for redistribution. But here again, the measure will capture both 
the potential negative and positive effects of these ties. Third, we use the geographical 
distance to the entrepreneur’s region or district of origin (regional or district capital). We 
compute this distance for every entrepreneur using geographical maps. We assume that a 
longer distance makes it more difficult and costly to observe the entrepreneur’s activities and 
productivity and hence redistributive pressure is supposed to decline with distance. Moreover, 
the costs of making transfers may also increase with distance in the absence of any formal 
banking system. However, this should not affect the amount that is transferred but rather the 
decision to transfer and the frequency of transfers. Obviously, positive social network effects 
should also decline with distance. Ideally of course one would like to have the travel time or 
the travel costs. However this would need to be collected in the field and hence is left for a 
future version of this paper.10 Fourth, we use the number of years a migrant is already in the 
capital. The idea behind is that family and kinship ties may not only erode with distance but 
also with time – an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ effect.11 Fifth, we also use population density 
and the total fertility rate in the area of origin to measure the potential size of the kin. 
Population density is taken from census data and the total fertility rate from Demographic and 
Health Survey (DHS) data with data sources as close as possible to the 1-2-3 survey year.12  
Whenever relevant, we control for ethnicity in our analysis, i.e. if we focus on the distance 
measure we compare two individuals from the same ethnic group living in different distance 
to his or her village of origin. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The average of the shares of the population from the same ethnic group within clusters is 37 
percent, however with a large standard deviation of 27 percent. The average of the population 
share having the same area of origin is with 3.8 percent much smaller. Here as well, the 
standard deviation is relatively high (4 percent). The distance to the area of origin is on 
average 189 km. Population density in the area of origin is about 300 inhabitants per km2. 
Here again the variance across observations is high. The total fertility rate is about 5.9 
children per women (standard deviation 1.1).  
 
                                                 
10 However, we made this exercise for Burkina Faso and found a rank correlation coefficient of more than 75% 
between distance and travel time and distance and travel costs. 
11 Stark (2009) discussed alternative reasons fro a gradual erosion of remittances. First, it is possible that on a 
schedule of declining marginal gains from remittances outflows, migrants reach the point at which the marginal 
gain from a dollar remitted is equal to the marginal gain from a dollar retained (and invested at destination). 
Second, a second migrant may follow the first migrant with the help of the first migrant’s remittances. Once, the 
second migrant is settled and starts to remit as well, the first migrant can reduce remittances. Third, migrants 
may remit more in the beginning to provide start-up capital for investments in the village; once, these 
investments generate benefits, the migrant can reduce remittances. 
12 See http://www.measuredhs.com/.  
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Table 3 reports pairwise correlation coefficients between the proxies of the potential intensity 
of family and kinship ties and different forms of transfers. The 1-2-3 surveys asked 
households to report what they have transferred to and received from other households in cash 
or in kind. In-kind transfers are given in self-estimated money values. It is important to 
remember that the sample used in this section is relatively small, because transfers were 
recorded in Phase 3 of the 1-2-3 surveys, which covers only a (representative) sub-sample of 
all entrepreneurs surveyed in phase 1 and 2. Moreover and as already mentioned above, Phase 
3 was not conducted in Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
The results in Table 3 show that the share of people in the neighbourhood belonging to the 
same ethnic group is significantly positively correlated with given transfers. It is also 
positively correlated with received transfers but this correlation coefficient is statistically 
insignificant. The share of people in the neighbourhood coming from the same area of origin 
is positively correlated with given transfers, negatively correlated with received transfers and 
positively correlated with net transfers, i.e. ‘given’ minus ‘received’ transfers. However, only 
the latter is statistically significant. Distance to the area of origin is statistically negatively 
correlated with given and received transfers. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
distance dilutes family ties and hence the further away the less is transferred. The time a 
migrant is already in the economic capital is positively correlated with received transfers and 
negatively with net transfers, i.e. the longer a migrant is already in the city the less is 
transferred to other households. However, two comments about these correlations are in order. 
First, transfers are usually difficult to measure, given their irregular nature and the fact that 
they are often done in-kind. Hence, measurement errors are certainly important and 
downward bias the correlation coefficients. Second, obviously, these are unconditional 
correlations, so if the theory above is true, that is that redistributive pressure has adverse 
incentive effects then we do not expect this correlation to be strong since entrepreneurs that 
are exposed to high pressure would reduce their effort level, generate less value added and 
therefore would have to transfer less to other households.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
In Table 4 we relate given transfers to value added. We use two specifications, a simple OLS 
model (col. (1)) and a tobit model (col. (2)), given that some entrepreneurs report no transfers 
at all. The OLS model yields a highly significant coefficient, suggesting that an increase of 
value added by one percent leads to an increase in given transfers by 0.18 percent. The tobit 
model yields a somewhat smaller and insignificant coefficient (p=0.139). We control in these 
regressions for gender and age of the owner of the firm, household size, ethnicity, the activity 
portfolio of the household and country effects. In columns (3) and (4) we use instead of value 
added, total household income as reported in phase 3 and add the share of earnings from 
dependent informal work and dependent formal work to the list of control variables. The 
propensity to transfer out of household income is again positive, as expected. The coefficient 
is even a bit higher as the one associated with value added. The coefficient associated with the 
share of informal earnings, is as our theoretical model predicts negative, i.e. the higher the 
share of informal earnings in total earnings the less is transferred. This is consistent with the 
idea that it is easier to hide earnings that comes from an activity outside the household where 
it is difficult to observe for others how much income has been generated. The results from the 
OLS model in column (3) suggest that an increase of the share of informal earnings in total 
earnings by 10 percentage points is associated with a decline of given transfers by 23.8 
percent holding constant total earnings. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
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5. Redistributive pressure, capital accumulation, labour demand and the 
owner’s effort level 
5.1 General results 
In this section we examine whether the potential intensity of family and kinship ties has any 
adverse incentive effects. We focus on three different inputs into (informal) household 
production of market goods: physical capital, K, total number of employed working hours 
(including those provided by the owner), TiL , and working hours provided by the owner alone, 
O
iL . In the appendix we show (Table A1) that these factors are indeed positively related to 
value added, i.e. they are relevant production inputs in our context. Assuming a simple Cobb-
Douglas-production technology, we find a reasonable order of magnitude for the estimated 
partial production elasticities. An increase in physical capital by one percent leads, depending 
on the exact specification, to an increase of value added by about 12 percent. The return to 
total hours of labour supplied is about 58 percent. In these estimations, we control again for 
gender and age of the owner of the firm, household size, ethnicity, the activity portfolio of the 
household country effects and now also sector effects. For the reasons given below we run the 
estimations over two different samples; all entrepreneurs and those that are in the economic 
capital for 15 years and less (for some case discussed below also five years and less). Again if 
the marginal returns to capital are computed at different points of the capital distribution, we 
find very high returns for low levels of capital and rather moderate returns at high levels of 
capital. This is documented in detail in Grimm et. al. (2010) and motivates this paper (see 
Introduction). Why are these high marginal returns not re-invested and move more small 
firms to the upper tail of the capital distribution?  
 
To examine the possibility of adverse incentive effects, which, again, we assume to act via 
reduced input use in the household’s production activity, we run the following three 
regressions: 
 
 KiKiKiKiKjiiKKi CSZXPK   5'4'3'2'10log , (16) 
 
 LTiLTiLTiLTiLTjiiLTiLTLT
T
i CSZXKPL   6'5'4'3'210 loglog , (17) 
 
 LOiLOiLOiLOiLOjiiLOiLOLO
O
i CSZXKPL   6'5'4'3'210 loglog , (18) 
 
where Pi is the vector of variables used to measure the potential intensity of family and 
kinship ties faced by household i. Xji is a vector of characteristics specific to the entrepreneur j 
residing in household i, such as age, gender, education and migrant status. Zi is a vector of 
household characteristics such as ethnicity and the activity portfolio of the household. The 
vectors Si and Ci control for sector and country effects respectively. Controlling for sector 
effects is important here, since production technologies are likely to differ between sectors. 
For instance, petty trade is less capital intensive than most transport services. Moreover, 
sector choice may, in turn, be correlated with (perceived) redistributive pressure. The terms  
are the respective error terms. Another more fundamental question is of course whether the 
data can be pooled across sectors and countries, despite the relative large homogeneity of 
these countries that are all members of the WAEMU. These tests will be done in future 
versions of this paper. 
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When running the regressions (16) – (18), we always correct standard errors for intra-cluster 
correlations. In total there are 558 clusters in Phase 2. To reduce a bias due to measurement 
and reporting errors, we trim the data and drop influential outliers from our sample that we 
identify by the DFITS-statistic. As suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980), we use a 
cutoff-value NkDFITS
ihj
/2  with k , the degrees of freedom (plus 1) and N  the number of 
observations. Depending on the estimation, this procedure removes between 25 and 100 
observations from our sample. 
 
In what follows, we discuss the results of each regression. We start with the model that tests 
for the effects of the potential intensity of family and kinship ties on the total stock of physical 
capital used. Given that entrepreneurs may accumulate physical capital in particular in the 
beginning of their activity, we estimate the model for those migrants that are for less than five 
years (col. (1) and (2)) and less than 15 years in the economic capital (col. (3) and (4)). This 
should reduce the problem of measurement error and increase the homogeneity of the sampled 
migrants. The results are shown in Table 5. The first specification uses a simple linear 
regression model (Columns (1) and (2)). The second specification uses a tobit model 
(Columns (3) and (4)) to account for the fact that 13.6% of all entrepreneurs do not use any 
physical capital. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The results show that the total capital stock is higher for enterprises owned by men than for 
women and it increases with age. Education is not significant in most cases Knowledge of 
French enters significantly only in the larger sample. There are no significant effects 
associated with other activities in the household, i.e. the capital stock is not significantly 
higher in households that also get earnings from dependent wage work in the public or private 
formal sector. This may surprise, but in these households the informal firm seems in most 
cases to be a secondary activity and hence investments are kept at a relatively low level. 
Sector effects are highly significant (coefficients not shown in Table). As one can expect 
particularly capital intensive is the transport sector. Petty trade, in contrast, uses only very 
little capital. Country effects were also included but are also not shown here. Overall, the OLS 
regressions explain about 20 percent of the total variance in observed capital stocks, showing 
what is well known in the literature that explaining investment and capital stocks for small 
and medium scale entrepreneurs is not straightforward, because of both the role of 
unobservables and measurement error and also because of the irregularity with which such 
investments occur.  
 
The variables used to measure family and kinship ties, our main variables of interest, are only 
significant in the smaller sample, i.e. when focusing on recent migrants and then only the 
effects associated with distance (col. (1) and (2)), which, again, we take as a measure of the 
potential intensity of the ties linked to the village of origin. In contrast, effects potentially 
associated with local family networks, i.e. kinship density in the neighbourhood, are 
insignificant. The positive coefficient of the distance variable is consistent with the idea that 
redistributive pressure and the related adverse incentive effects get diluted with distance. The 
further away an entrepreneur is from the family, the higher the investment in the production 
activity. The estimates in columns (1) and (2) suggest for instance that an increase of the 
distance from 100 km to 200 km implies an increase in the size of the used capital stock by 
about 30 percent, which economically is an important effect. Here again it is interesting to 
refer to the paper by Beegle et al. (2008). They found for Tanzania a positive effect of 
distance on consumption growth, i.e. migrants that were further away from their village of 
origin knew higher long-term consumption growth than those that stayed closer. They 
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interpreted this effect as the result of a positive correlation between favourable work and 
business opportunities and distance, i.e. the larger the migration radius the higher the potential 
returns from migration. However, they also show that migrants share less than their non-
migrant counterparts, controlling for household fixed effects, i.e. migrants transfer less than 
their brothers that stayed at home. This finding is also consistent with a situation in which 
adverse incentive effects decline with distance and in which distance helps to protect savings 
for profitable investments. In our case, we consider only migrants that went to the economic 
capital, so the potential pool of business opportunities is held constant for a given country 
only distance varies across migrants. What could however drive our results is that distance 
may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of entrepreneurs, in a sense that high ability 
entrepreneurs are willing to migrate further. If these (unobserved) abilities also drive 
investment in physical capital, then the positive effect of distance may just pick up the effect 
of abilities. Below we undertake some robustness checks in order to rule out this possibility.  
 
Next, we turn to the regressions that explore the effects of redistributive pressure on the total 
amount of working hours in the enterprise (Table 6). Again, we use two different samples. A 
sample that is limited to entrepreneurs that are less than 15 years in the capital (cols. (1)) and 
a sample with all migrant entrepreneurs (cols. (2)). Given that we look now at a flow and not 
stock measure, recall bias is not a problem anymore and hence there is no need to limit the 
sample to very recent migrants. We find that firms owned by men employ more labour. The 
use of labour also increases with the size of the capital stock. Age, knowledge of French, 
education and the household’s activity portfolio are not significant. However, there are 
interesting effects associated with the three measure of the potential intensity of family and 
kinship ties. The share of people in the neighbourhood that belong to the same ethnic group 
than the entrepreneur has a positive effect. Likewise the share of the population in the 
neighbourhood that grew up in the same area of origin also has a positive effect. However, 
being closer to the area of origin has a significant negative effect, i.e. the coefficient 
associated with distance is again positive. The effects differ not much between both samples. 
An increase of the share of people in the neighbourhood belonging to the same ethnic group 
by 10 percentage points increases the amount of labour hours used by 2.8 percent. Evaluated 
at the sample mean this implies approximately 10.7 hours per month. If the proportion of 
people that share the same origin is increased by 1 percentage point (sample mean is about 3.8 
percent) labour hours employed increases by 1.4 percent. An increase of distance by 100 
percent is associated with an increase of employed labour hours by about 6 to 9 percent. 
Hence, the interesting finding here is that family and kinship ties tied to the city are associated 
with positive effects – the exact channels need to be investigated – whereas family and 
kinship ties tight to the village are associated with negative effects. These findings hinge of 
course upon the quality of our measures of the potential intensity of such ties. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Finally, we explore the effects of family and kinship ties on working hours provided by the 
owner alone. Again we find that social networks within the city are positively correlated with 
working hours. For instance, an increase by ten percentage points of the share of people in the 
neighbourhood belonging to the same ethnic group increases the owner’s labour hours by 
about 1 to 2 percent, which corresponds at the sample mean to about 3 to 5.5 hours per month. 
Or, if the share of the population from the same area of origin increases by 1 percentage point, 
working hours increase by about 0.7 percent or about 2 hours at the sample mean. Again, we 
also find positive effects associated with distance to the area of origin. Owners further away 
from their area of origin use more of their time for their production activity, which again is 
consistent with the idea that redistributive pressure from the family reduces incentives. For 
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instance, a decrease in the distance by 100 percent, decreases labour hours provided by the 
owner by about 4 percent or 11.5 hours at the sample mean. Hence, an entrepreneur who is 
exposed to strong sharing obligations may deny an additional order towards the end of the 
month, if he or she feels that the return would anyway need to be shared with the extended 
family. The estimations using total labour on the one hand and total labour by the owner on 
the other hand are also consistent, in a sense that the estimated coefficients are higher when 
total labour is used; adverse incentives affect both, own and hired labour. If only own labour 
would be affected the coefficient associated with total labour should be smaller.  
 
 
5.2 The effects of splitting up enterprises  
As explained above, in our analysis we aggregated all enterprises in a given household into 
one single enterprise. We briefly discussed the various reasons why a household may own 
several enterprises, such as diversification to reduce risk and the absence of income pooling 
among household members. However, we also evoked the possibility that splitting up 
enterprises may be a strategy to avoid or reduce ‘taxes’ and demands from the extended 
family, because it is easier to hide several smaller enterprises than one large enterprise. 
Camilleri (1996), for instance, reported anecdotic evidence that successful entrepreneurs 
employ their kin in peripheral firms to keep them away from the main and productive activity. 
In this subsection we look at the correlation between the number of firms and transfers given 
to other households. We estimate a simple regression of the following form: 
 
 TiiTTiTjiTiiTTi CZXFVAT   54'3'2'10log , (19) 
 
where Ti stands for given transfers in household i, VAi for value added, Fi for the number of 
firms in household i, Xji is a vector of characteristics specific to the entrepreneur j residing in 
household i, such as age, gender, education and migrant status, Zi is a vector of household 
characteristics such as ethnicity and the activity portfolio of the household (e.g. whether one 
or several members of the household work in the public or private formal sector) and Ci 
stands for country-specific effects. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 shows the results. It can be seen that having two firms compared to having only one 
firm is clearly associated with lower transfers controlling for value added of the firm. The 
effect associated with having three firms is not statistically different from having only one 
firm, but this may be due to the fact that many households have two firms (17.2 percent) but 
only few have more than two firms (3.5 percent). The results are thus consistent with the idea 
that splitting up enterprises is an effective way to reduce transfers to other households. It 
would also explain why we find in the given context so many small firms, many of them 
highly productive. It would imply that benefits are rather invested in new firms than in 
existing ones.  
 
 
5.3 Robustness checks 
We mentioned above that one of the caveats in our analysis related to the distance variable is 
that distance may be correlated with unobserved characteristics of entrepreneurs, in a sense 
that high ability entrepreneurs are willing to migrate further. If these (unobserved) abilities 
also drive investment in physical capital and the use of labour input, then the positive effect of 
distance may just pick up the effect of abilities. To rule out this possibility, we re-estimate 
equations (16) to (18) for various sub-samples that are limited to entrepreneurs that migrated 
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at least a certain distance away from their area of origin. The idea is that a migrant who is, say 
5km away from his original home may indeed largely differ in observables and unobservables 
characteristics from a migrant who is 100 km away, but that a migrant who is 100 km away is 
not very different from a migrant who is 200 km away. In other words the relationship 
between distance and these unobserved characteristics is likely to be non-linear. We show the 
results of this exercise graphically (Figure 1). With respect to the capital stock (Figure 1a), we 
see that the effect associated with distance is robust, it even increases if we limit the 
estimation to entrepreneurs that are at least 75 km or more away from their area of origin. 
Only if we chose a very high threshold (150km and more) the effect is reduced again and in 
fact becomes insignificant. But this is mainly due to the fact that the sample size then 
becomes of course very small and hence coefficient cannot be estimated very precisely. The 
results for total hours of labour used and hours provided by the owner are very similar 
(Figures 1b and 1c). The estimated effects are very robust and stay positive over a wide range 
of distances. Hence, we are quite confident that distance does not just capture a difference in 
effort-related unobservables between those internal migrants that stay close to their original 
home and those that migrate far.  
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Another aspect should be kept in mind. We only look at migrants that decided to migrate to 
the economic capital of their country. We may assume that this decision is often taken 
whatever the distance to the capital is. In other words migrants do not so much choose 
between places of different distance to their home, but rather whether they migrate to one of 
the secondary cities or to the economic capital. In particular in our sample of West-African 
countries which more or less all have one major large urban centre and otherwise only smaller 
secondary cities and towns the differences between both types of destinations are quite 
pronounced. Hence, we may argue that all those that opted for the economic capital share 
some common unobservable characteristics, and hence the potential bias associated with our 
distance measure may be relatively small. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Previous research has shown that in many low and middle income countries micro and small 
entrepreneurs achieve relative high marginal returns to capital but show only very low re-
investment rates. We evoked a couple of possible explanation for this observation, one of 
which is the role of forced redistribution that prevents entrepreneurs from saving and 
investing. ‘Forced redistribution’ is in the anthropological and sociological literature 
prominently discussed and often presented as a typical feature of Sub-Saharan African 
societies. However, there is only little empirical analysis that would allow judging whether 
forced redistribution is really an obstacle to economic activities in that region. In this paper 
we focus on family and kinship ties and how such ties help or not micro and small 
entrepreneurs in Western Africa to develop their business. We start from a relatively simple 
theoretical model in which households consume and pursue different income generating 
activities, mainly the production of goods and services and the engagement in dependent 
wage work outside the household. Value added of the household business is subject to a 
solidarity tax imposed by the household’s kin-group. We assume that the size of this tax 
depends on the distributional norms prevailing in the relevant kin group, the size of the kin 
and the costs for the kin to observe the enterprise’s profit. The model implies that with an 
increasing ‘tax’, fewer resources will be allocated to the household business.  
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We then proceed exploring whether this hypothesis is consistent with empirical evidence. 
Using a sample of migrant entrepreneurs, i.e. migrants from the country side or secondary 
cities that joined the economic capital and work as an (informal) entrepreneur, we test 
whether the intensity of family and kinship ties is negatively correlated with the labour and 
capital inputs used for the entrepreneurial activity. We use four variables to measure the 
intensity of family and kinship networks: first, the share of the population from the same 
ethnic group in the cluster in which the entrepreneur resides; second, the share of the 
population in the respective cluster that grew up in the same area as the entrepreneur – i.e. in 
the same region or district of the country; third, the geographical distance to the 
entrepreneur’s region or district of origin; and, fourth, the number of years a migrant is 
already in the capital. To avoid endogeneity problems, it is important to focus on potential 
pressure and not on actual pressure, which would for example be reflected in actually paid 
transfers or the number of non-relatives in the household.  
 
Regarding the use of labour inputs, i.e. total labour and labour supplied by the owner, we find 
that local family and kinship-ties enhance the use of that resource. We do not find any 
correlation with the use of physical capital. However, distance to the area of origin of the 
migrant, which we interpret as a proxy for the intensity of the links with the family and the 
kin in the village of origin suggests throughout that looser ties are correlated with a more 
intense use of both physical capital and labour. Although, we are not in a position to make any 
causal claims, this finding is at least consistent with the hypothesis that redistributive pressure 
tight to the village leads to adverse incentive effects. These adverse incentive effects seem to 
be diluted with distance. Greater distance from home seems to make it easier to protect 
savings from abusive demands and to invest. We can at least rule out that this result is driven 
by unobservables that would determine both the willingness and ability to migrate far and the 
ability to run an enterprise. We find also weak evidence that the duration a migrant left the 
village controlling for the enterprise’s age, is positively correlated with the use of capital and 
labour. Beegle et al. (2008) showed for the case of Tanzania that distance is positively related 
to the benefits of migration and that migrants transfer less than their siblings that stayed in the 
village. Although their focus is not on forced solidarity, but on the benefits of migration and 
risk sharing, these results are consistent with the findings here. 
 
We also show that, controlling for total income, migrants that draw their income from several 
enterprises transfer less to their families than those that manage only one firm. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that some entrepreneurs rather invest in several activities that 
can easily be hidden, than in one single large firm that would then send a clear signal of 
entrepreneurial success to the entrepreneur’s kin. It would also partly explain why we see so 
many small firms with less than two or three employees and only few larger firms. We also 
provide evidence, in line with our theoretical model, that the propensity to remit out of profits 
is larger than out of wages. Suggesting that the latter can more easily be hidden and that 
potential entrepreneurs feeling themselves exposed to intense redistributive pressure rather 
use a larger share of their labour for an activity as a wage worker. 
 
One may of course argue that remittances from urban migrants to the village are part of the 
migration contract and serve to pay back the costs of migration. Although we definitely do not 
deny the existence of such payments, they do not invalidate our conclusions. If such a contract 
is concluded in a form that it implies adverse incentive effects the contract is inefficient and 
the inefficiency would need to be addressed. If such adverse incentive effects are not inherent 
in such contracts, we would expect that migrants just maximize their profits, i.e. use their 
resources optimally, and then redistribute part of their profits to the family. Colemen (1990) 
noted that reciprocity is more than repayment, it is a norm that prescribes a certain type of 
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behaviour towards relevant others. The fact that we find that family and kinship ties within 
the city enhance the amounts of labour and capital used for production suggest that these ties 
are rather build on mutual support. The exact nature of these ties need to be studied in future 
work, but it is likely that they share similar features with the broader concept of social capital 
and hence may provide for instance credit, insurance and access to clients and markets. 
 
Obviously, one should be careful to draw direct policy implications from these findings. They 
raise the issue of the compatibility of traditional norms with modern economic development 
and thus lead to a debate that has marked quite significantly modernisation theory fifty years 
ago. However, the newer literature suggests that such norms should be considered as largely 
endogenous and hence as more and more people see the benefits of stepping out of traditional 
kin-based support networks and as more formalized insurance mechanisms become more 
widespread the negative forces of family and kinship ties may loose their importance. The 
effects related to family and kinship ties in the city suggest that such ties have the potential to 
enhance entrepreneurial activity. If future research investigates further the underlying 
mechanisms, policy can try to mimic such support networks for those entrepreneurs that are 
outside such networks. 
 
We end with word of caution. This paper should be seen as an attempt to conceptualize the 
positive and negative effects of family and kinship ties in the context of African 
entrepreneurs. The empirical evidence, although fully consistent with our theoretical 
considerations, is based on cross-sectional data, which obviously makes it difficult to deal 
adequately with unobserved heterogeneity; a problem that may be particularly important in 
our context. 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Regression of value added on factor use 
 
[Table A1 about here] 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean S.D. 
Owner characteristics   
Male (=1) 0.509 0.500 
Age owner 38.4 11.4 
Speaks French (=1) 0.434 0.496 
No diploma 0.718 0.450 
Primary completed 0.179 0.383 
Some secondary 0.048 0.214 
Other post primary 0.055 0.228 
Ethnic group 1 0.420 0.494 
Ethnic group 2 0.184 0.388 
Ethnic group 3 0.195 0.397 
   
Household characteristics   
Household size 6.3 4.2 
Only informal firm 0.795 0.404 
Public wage earner 0.097 0.296 
Private formal wage earner 0.100 0.300 
Other combination 0.008 0.092 
Firm characteristics     
Age of firm 8.6 8.6 
Clothing and apparel 0.096 0.294 
Other manufact. and food 0.143 0.351 
Construction 0.087 0.282 
Wholesale/retail shops 0.114 0.318 
Petty trading 0.272 0.445 
Hotels and restaurants 0.073 0.261 
Repair services 0.053 0.225 
Transport 0.052 0.221 
Other services 0.110 0.314 
Ann. VA in intl.$ PPP 5556 28459 
Monthly hours owner 225 127 
Total monthly hours 381 379 
Total staff incl. owner 1.891 1.566 
Hired paid staff 0.241 0.864 
No physical capital (=1) 0.126 0.332 
Physical. cap. in intl. $ PPP 1029 3647 
Physical cap. (lowest 33%)  11 12 
Physical cap. (middle 33%)  127 75 
Physical cap. (highest 33%)  2953 5865 
No. of firms 1.3 0.6 
Country   
Benin 0.159 0.366 
Burkina Faso 0.141 0.349 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.162 0.368 
Mali 0.178 0.383 
Niger 0.062 0.241 
Senegal 0.128 0.335 
Togo 0.169 0.375 
N 2369   
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
 
 26
Table 2: Proxies of the potential intensity of family and kinship ties 
  Mean S.D. 
Share same ethnic group 0.373 0.266 
Share same origin 0.038 0.043 
Distance to origin 188.5 169.4 
Time since migration 17.7 11.7 
Pop. density at origin 308.3 558.9 
Total fertility rate at origin 5.9 1.1 
N  2369  
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Transfers, family and kinship ties  
  Ln transfers Ln transfers Net 
  given received transfer 
Share same ethnic group 0.158* 0.048 -0.037 
 (0.000) (0.247) (0.370) 
Share same origin 0.065 -0.031 0.072* 
 (0.116) (0.456) (0.086) 
Ln distance to origin -0.126* -0.082* 0.039 
 (0.002) (0.049) (0.352) 
Years since migration 0.062 0.1311* -0.103* 
  (0.139) (0.002) (0.014) 
Note: * significant at 10%. Significance level in parentheses. 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
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Table 4: Firm’s performance, sources of household income and transfers given 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Transfers given 
  OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
Ln value added 0.175*** 0.139   
 (0.065) (0.097)   
Ln total household income   0.334** 0.499* 
   (0.146) (0.261) 
Share of income from dep. inf. work   -2.378*** -3.771** 
   (0.831) (1.483) 
Share of income from dep formal work   0.579 0.866 
   (0.754) (1.108) 
Male (=1) -0.037 0.025 -0.117 -0.250 
 (0.262) (0.418) (0.296) (0.458) 
Age owner -0.001 -0.000 0.003 0.009 
 (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) 
Household size 0.064* 0.091* 0.018 0.012 
 (0.036) (0.055) (0.038) (0.062) 
Ethnic group 1 (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Ethnic group 2 -0.122 0.229 0.537 0.884 
 (0.418) (0.648) (0.525) (0.757) 
Ethnic group 3 -0.314 -0.027 0.122 0.239 
 (0.329) (0.571) (0.445) (0.635) 
Only informal firm (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Public wage earner 0.798** 0.905   
 (0.359) (0.624)   
Private formal wage earner 0.770* 0.689   
 (0.463) (0.757)   
Other combination 3.798*** 4.002*   
 (0.527) (2.234)   
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Intercept 2.600*** 1.684 2.292** 0.599 
 (0.701) (1.134) (1.106) (1.788) 
R-squared 0.123   0.078   
N 562 580 393 393 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the segment level). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
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Table 5: Family and kinship ties and entrepreneur’s use of physical capital 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Migrants, Migrants, 
 
5 years and less in the 
capital 
15 years and less in the 
capital 
  OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
Share same ethnic group 0.310 0.291 0.158 0.170 
 (0.549) (0.581) (0.347) (0.359) 
Share same origin 0.464 0.370 0.271 0.062 
 (3.105) (3.085) (1.972) (1.803) 
Ln distance to origin 0.263* 0.316* 0.002 0.009 
 (0.152) (0.161) (0.089) (0.098) 
Years since migration 0.032 0.042 0.033** 0.036** 
 (0.067) (0.083) (0.016) (0.017) 
Male (=1) 1.061*** 1.118*** 0.878*** 0.917*** 
 (0.316) (0.337) (0.178) (0.197) 
Age owner 0.041*** 0.047*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) 
Speaks French (=1) 0.297 0.384 0.341* 0.364* 
 (0.345) (0.388) (0.182) (0.219) 
No diploma (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Primary completed -0.529 -0.753* -0.212 -0.300 
 (0.391) (0.443) (0.220) (0.241) 
Some secondary -0.218 -0.355 -0.282 -0.357 
 (0.743) (0.770) (0.347) (0.383) 
Other post primary -0.718 -1.051 -0.328 -0.485 
 (0.710) (0.678) (0.369) (0.377) 
Ethnic group 1 (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Ethnic group 2 -0.700* -0.868* -0.524** -0.586** 
 (0.399) (0.503) (0.215) (0.249) 
Ethnic group 3 0.030 0.068 -0.084 -0.086 
 (0.311) (0.353) (0.180) (0.211) 
Age of firm -0.011 -0.019 0.001 0.001 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.013) (0.016) 
Only informal firm     
     
Public wage earner 0.416 0.489 0.345 0.397 
 (0.438) (0.489) (0.235) (0.268) 
Private formal wage earner 0.550 0.556 0.222 0.252 
 (0.400) (0.439) (0.235) (0.264) 
Other combination -0.849 -1.093 -0.972 -1.158 
 (1.515) (1.353) (0.891) (0.788) 
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 1.972* 1.592 3.714*** 3.512*** 
 (1.034) (1.140) (0.589) (0.664) 
R-squared 0.215   0.185   
N 370 370 1117 1117 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the segment level). * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
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Table 6: Family and kinship ties and entrepreneur’s use of labour 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln total labour hours Ln total labour hours owner 
 Migrants,  Migrants,  
  
15 years and 
less in the 
capital All migrants 
15 years and 
less in the 
capital All migrants 
Share same ethnic group 0.281** 0.248*** 0.217** 0.117 
 (0.132) (0.096) (0.097) (0.072) 
Share same origin 1.340** 1.356*** 0.781* 0.643* 
 (0.532) (0.444) (0.428) (0.361) 
Ln distance to origin 0.087*** 0.057** 0.048* 0.032* 
 (0.033) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019) 
Years since migration 0.012* 0.005** 0.005 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Ln physical capital 0.176*** 0.169*** 0.069*** 0.059*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) 
No capital 0.402*** 0.367*** 0.118 0.058 
 (0.124) (0.092) (0.097) (0.069) 
Male (=1) 0.334*** 0.298*** 0.359*** 0.284*** 
 (0.073) (0.054) (0.054) (0.039) 
Age owner -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Speaks French (=1) -0.003 0.044 -0.018 -0.010 
 (0.078) (0.056) (0.058) (0.042) 
No diploma (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Primary completed -0.062 -0.024 -0.058 -0.008 
 (0.091) (0.066) (0.065) (0.047) 
Some secondary 0.119 0.147 -0.056 0.005 
 (0.144) (0.097) (0.105) (0.070) 
Other post primary -0.194 -0.147 -0.418*** -0.280*** 
 (0.150) (0.119) (0.121) (0.094) 
Ethnic group 1 (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Ethnic group 2 -0.208 -0.162** -0.139 -0.104* 
 (0.130) (0.079) (0.092) (0.058) 
Ethnic group 3 0.076 0.120** 0.028 0.052 
 (0.073) (0.051) (0.057) (0.038) 
Age of firm 0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.000 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Only informal firm (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Public wage earner -0.101 -0.094 0.074 -0.088 
 (0.114) (0.071) (0.082) (0.060) 
Private formal wage earner -0.105 -0.047 -0.033 -0.015 
 (0.100) (0.064) (0.080) (0.054) 
Other combination -0.321 -0.567* -0.347** -0.403** 
 (0.244) (0.307) (0.175) (0.184) 
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 3.865*** 3.934*** 4.309*** 4.428*** 
 (0.289) (0.200) (0.218) (0.147) 
Table 6 continues next page. 
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Table 6 (… continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln total labour hours Ln total labour hours owner 
 Migrants,  Migrants,  
  
15 years and 
less in the 
capital All migrants 
15 years and 
less in the 
capital All migrants 
R-squared 0.208 0.206 0.136 0.116 
N 1116 2288 1116 2288 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the segment level).  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
 
 
Table 7: The effect of splitting enterprises on given transfers 
 Transfers 
 given 
Ln value added 0.110*** 
 (0.041) 
Single firm (Ref.) 
  
Two firms -0.373* 
 (0.217) 
More than two firms -0.054 
  (0.493) 
Control variables See notes 
  
R-squared 0.130 
N 1194 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the segment level).  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The regression controls for gender and age  
of owner, household size, ethnicity, the activity portfolio of the household and 
country effects. 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
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Figure 1: The effect of distance on input use for alternative distance thresholds for sample inclusion 
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(a) The effect of distance on the use of physical capital 
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(b) The effect of distance on the use of total hours of labour 
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(c) The effect of distance on the use of total hours of labour 
 
Note: The figures show the coefficient of distance in a regression of input use on distance, controlling for all 
other variables that are noted in Tables 5 (physical capital) and 6 (labour) respectively. The horizontal axis 
shows the required minimum distance to the area of origin required that an observation is included in the sample 
(sample size declines this distance becomes larger). The vertical axis shows the corresponding regression 
coefficients along with the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
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Table A1: Value added and factor use 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Migrants,  Migrants,  
  
15 years and 
less in the 
capital 
All 
migrants 
15 years and 
less in the 
capital 
All 
migrants 
Ln total labour hours 0.582*** 0.572***   
 (0.050) (0.043)   
Ln total labour hours   0.349*** 0.376*** 
   (0.058) (0.046) 
Ln physical capital 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.161*** 0.188*** 
 (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.017) 
No capital 0.338** 0.287** 0.402** 0.430*** 
 (0.157) (0.119) (0.157) (0.121) 
Male (=1) 0.575*** 0.405*** 0.589*** 0.485*** 
 (0.100) (0.070) (0.105) (0.071) 
Age owner 0.007 -0.003 0.008* -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Speaks French (=1) 0.196* 0.187** 0.160 0.185** 
 (0.107) (0.074) (0.111) (0.075) 
No diploma (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Primary completed -0.003 -0.032 0.059 -0.015 
 (0.114) (0.082) (0.115) (0.084) 
Some secondary 0.346** 0.123 0.313 0.227 
 (0.174) (0.134) (0.197) (0.140) 
Other post primary 0.170 0.299** 0.343* 0.393*** 
 (0.199) (0.143) (0.193) (0.139) 
Ethnic group 1 (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Ethnic group 2 0.230** 0.042 0.137 0.015 
 (0.112) (0.081) (0.115) (0.080) 
Ethnic group 3 0.001 0.024 0.009 0.035 
 (0.102) (0.071) (0.106) (0.074) 
Age of firm 0.017** 0.019*** 0.014* 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Only informal firm (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) (Ref.) 
     
Public wage earner -0.087 -0.103 -0.065 -0.076 
 (0.124) (0.091) (0.122) (0.093) 
Private formal wage earner 0.144 0.086 0.095 0.063 
 (0.130) (0.087) (0.139) (0.087) 
Other combination -1.668*** -1.747*** -1.679*** -1.821*** 
 (0.366) (0.300) (0.384) (0.299) 
Sector effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 2.534*** 2.374*** 3.027*** 3.110*** 
 (0.342) (0.254) (0.376) (0.288) 
R-squared 0.386 0.415 0.342 0.359 
N 1065 2178 1061 2174 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the segment level).  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: 1-2-3 surveys, WAEMU, 2001/02. 
 
